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to be justified in declining to recognize minute distinctions within the
intermediate zone of culpable conduct, which distinctions are only
designated by such terms as "wantonness," "wilfulness," and "reckless-
ness," all of uncertain meaning and import.2' It is very doubtful
whether any valid distinction can be drawn between the "wanton or
wilful" clause of the amendment and the "reckless disregard" clause
of the original Act even on the basis of terminology since the terms
are often used as synonomous. 22
It is submitted that any distinction between the courts' definitions
of the type of conduct to which liability attaches under the staute as
originally enacted and under the statute as amended are more imag-
inary than real. The court justifiably declined to multiply the shad-
ows in what is now a twilight zone in the law, and although the legis-
lature must be assumed to have intended to change the existing law,
that result has not been reached.
CARRIERS
LIMITATION OF TORT LIABILITY BY CONTRACT
Plaintiff, while a passenger on defendant's steamship, deposited
cash and jewelry in the amount of $13,360 in defendant's safe-deposit
box. Her ticket contained a contract limiting the carrier's liability
to $250; however, insurance was offered at the rate of 1% of the
excess, upon a written declaration of value, delivered to the carrier.
Plaintiff did not take out any insurance, and upon demand defendant
failed to return her property. Plaintiff brought action for the full
value of the property, charging breach of the bailment contract
and conversion. The court granted the defendant's motion for a
directed verdict of $250 in favor of the plaintiff, in accordance with
the special contract. Plaintiff appealed. Held, judgment affirmed.
Reichman v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, - N.Y.-, 49
N.E. (2d) 474 (1943).
The case first raises a question as to the circumstances under
which a carrier may limit by contract its liability for negligence., At
21. The cases are legion in which courts have attempted to define and
distinguish these terms. See 36 Words and Phrases 489-509; 45
Words and Phrases 186-271; 44 Words and Phrases 589-623. One
writer on this subject has pointed out that " . . . the terms
most commonly used in automobile law may be arranged in the
following ascending order of culpability: Negligence, Gross Negli-
gence, Heedlessness, Recklessness, Wantonness, Wilfulness, and
Intentional Acts. . . ." Appleman, "Wilful and Wanton Con-
duct in Automobile Guest Cases" (1937) 13 Ind. L. J. 131, 133-
134. Any attempt to classify culpable conduct into so many
types would appear only to create confusion and uncertainty.
22. For instance see Restatement, "Torts" (1934) §500 and the
"special note" following; Harper, "Law of Torts" (1933) §151;
Berry, "Law of Automobiles" (7th ed. 1935) §2.340.
1. Under the law of bailments, failure to return goods bailed es-
tablishes a prima facie case of negligence, and bailee must show
that loss or damage was caused without fault on his part. Hack-
ney et al. v. Perry, 152 Ala. 626, 44 So. 1029 (1907); Employers'
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common law a common carrier was liable as an insurer for the goods
intrusted to its care and for the baggage of its passengers, except for
damages occasioned by the act of God or the king's enemies. 2 Early
American cases first adhered to the common law rule, precluding ex-
emptions from negligence liability, on the basis of public policy. 3 But
later cases, apparently influenced by the "freedom of contract" doc-
trine manifest during the later 19th century, introduced an element
of diversity, by holding such contracts to be valid and enforceable. 4
At the present time, however, it is generally accepted that a carrier
may not impose a limitation against liability for loss or damage of
goods or baggage caused by its own negligence.5
But this rule is not without its qualifications. The exception to
the general rule, and a method almost universally adopted by carriers,
is that a limitation based upon the agreed valuation of the goods or
property is valid, even as to negligence.6 Certain conditions are gen-
Fire Insurance Co. v. Consolidated Garage and Sales Co. et al.,
85 Ind. App. 674, 155 N.E. 533 (1927). It would therefore follow
that if, in the absence of proof rebutting the presumption of
negligence, the defendant's contract did not limit its liability as
to negligence, the judgment should have been for the plaintiff.
2. Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 91 Eng. Rep. R. 25 (K.B.
1703); Forward v. Pittard, 1 T.R. 27, 99 Eng. Rep. R. 953 (K.B.
1785).
3. Gould et al. v. Hill et al., 2 Hill 623 (N.Y. 1842); Cole v. Good-
win and Story, 19 Wend. 251 (N.Y. 1834).
4. See Nicholas et al. v. New York Central & H.R.R.R., 89 N.Y.
370, 372 (1882); Mynard et al. v. Syracuse, B. & N.Y.R.R.,
71 N.Y. 180, 185 (1877) ; cf. Thayer v. St. Louis, A. & T.H.
R.R., 22 Ind. 26 (1864), which recognized a distinction between
degrees of negligence and held that a carrier could not exempt
itself from liability for gross negligence, but conceded the right
as to ordinary negligence. Contra: Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17
Wall. 357 (U.S. 1873) (federal rule); Steel v. Townsend, 37 Ala.
247 (1861); Ohio & Miss. Ry. v. Selby, 47 Ind. (1874) (over-
ruled Thayer v. St. Louis, etc. R.R., supra); Fillebraun v. Grand
Trunk Ry., 55 Me. 472 (1867); Empire Transportation Co. v.
Wamsutta Oil Co., 63 Pa. St. 14 (1869).
5. Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Exp. Co., 93 U.S. 174 (1876);
Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 (U.S. 1873); Saunders
v. Southern Ry., 128 Fed. 15 (C.C.A. 6th, 1904); The Oregon, 133
Fed. 609 (C.C.A. 9th, 1904); Franklin v. Southern Pac. Co., 203
Cal. 680, 265 Pac. 936 (1928); Knight v. Carolina Coach Co., 201
N.C. 261, 159 S.E. 311 (1931); see Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie &
West. Transportation Co., 117 U.S. 312, 317 (1886).
6. Hart v. Pennsylvania R.R., 112 U.S. 331 (1884), the principal
case, like most cases subsequent, declared the common law rule,
but admitted the exception in case of an agreed valuation, dis-
tinguishing this rule on the ground that it had no tendency to
exempt from liability for negligence. Anomalously enough, the
Hart decision at 341 appropriated the public policy argument used
heretofore to substantiate the common law rule, to support the
agreed valuation rule: "It is repugnant to the principles of free-
dom of contract and in conflict with public policy if a shipper
should be allowed to reap the benefit of the contract if there is
no loss and to repudiate it in case of loss." Also see Squire et
al. v. New York Central R.R., 98 Mass. 239 (1867); Kopetzky et
al. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 131 Misc. 599, 227 N.Y. Supp. 539 (N.Y.
19441
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erally imposed as prerequisite to the application of the rule: (1) the
rate must be graduated according to the value of the property, and
(2) the shipper must have the privilege of full coverage.7 There seems
to be no deviation from the rule that an effort to limit liability by a
uniform, predetermined valuation, arbitrarily fixed, and without any
reference to actual value of the property is void.8 Some cases have
prescribed alternative rates, fairly based upon valuation,9 or an es-
sential choice of rates,'0 so that the passenger or shipper might have
secured full coverage or protection for his property by payment of
a higher rate for the carriage." It follows that an attempt at total
exemption from liability for negligence is void.' 2 The same result is
reached where a bill of lading contains an express agreement as to
valuation, but where such valuation appears to be a standard, prede-
termined limitation upon goods of that nature, set by the carrier,
and no choice of rates is given.13 Nor are the word "reduced fare,"
when printed on the ticket, sufficient to sustain a limitation where
it appears to be the full and only fare.14 On the other hand, where
there is no reference to reduced fare in the clause purporting to limit
liability, the court will not assume that a reduced rate was given as
ground for giving effect to the limitation of liability.15
In regard to the prerequisite of complete coverage, this has been
held to exclude limitations as to invoice value of goods,' 6 and also to
render invalid attempts to limit value to that of time and place of
shipment, even though a higher valuation was placed on goods.'7 But
where no declaration of value was given or requested, it has been held
City Ct. 1928); Belger v. Dinsmore, 51 N.Y. 166 (1872); Cul-
breth v. Martin et al., 179 N.C. 678, 103 S.E. 374 (1920). But
cf. Zetler v. Tonopah & Goldfield R.R., 35 Nev. 384, 129 Pac. 299(1913), aff'd on rehearing, 37 Nev. 486, 143 Pac. 119 (1914),
which held such a limitation unavailable, where the carrier had
wilfully taken or withheld baggage from the passenger, or negli-
gently delivered it to the wrong person.
7. Franklin v. Southern Pac. Co., 203 Cal. 680, 265 Pac. 939 (1928).
8. Everett v. Norfolk & S. R.R., 138 N.C. 68, 50 S.E. 557 (1905).
9. Cin., New Orleans & T.P. Ry. v. Rankin, 241 U.S. 319, 327 (1916).
10. Pierce Co. v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 236 U.S. 278 (1915).
11. Hartzberg v. New York Central R.R., - Misc.-, 41 N.Y.S.
(2d) 345 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1943).
12. Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 354 N.Y. 407, 173 N.E. 564
(1930).
13. Union Pac. R.R. v. Burke, 255 U.S. 317 (1921); Georgia R.R.
& Banking Co. v. Keener, 93 Ga. 808, 21 S.E. 287 (1894).
14. Southwestern Transportation Co. v. Poye, 194 Ark. 982, 110 S.W.
(2d) 494 (1937).
15. Moore v. American Scantic Line, 121 F. (2d) 767 (C.C.A. 2d,
1941).
16. Kilthau v. International Mercantile Marine Co., 245 N.Y. 361,
157 N.E. 267 (1927).
17. Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 254 N.Y. 407, 173 N.E.
564 (1930). The general rule is that a carrier is liable for
negligence for the value of goods at destination.
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that the shipper's acceptance of a receipt containing provisions limit-
ing liability made the provision binding. s
The agreed valuation doctrine has been rationalized on the basis
of estoppel, 19 upon the basis of liquidated damages,20 and upon the
basis of a "release tied to the rate."121 Statutory enactments have in
general incorporated the general theory and given it universal appli-
cation, not only to railroads, but to steamship companies,22 to motor
carriers,23 to telegraph companies, 24 and to warehousemen. 25 Both
the Harter Act of 1893,26 regulating shipping, and the second Cummins
Amendment of 191627 to the Hepburn Act, regulating interstate car-
riers, made provisions for limitations of liability according to the
declared value of freight and baggage.
It would seem, therefore, from the point of view of both statutes
and judicial decisions, that the contract accepted by the plaintiff in
this case met the prerequisites of a valid contract limiting the liability
of the carrier by an agreed valuation, inasmuch as arL opportunity,
was provided for full coverage of the property at rates corresponding
to the value declared. It was reasonable in its terms and was author-
ized by the settled law of the jurisdiction.2 8 Plaintiff's omission to
take advantage of the complete coverage provisions restricted her to
a limited recovery.
The dissenting opinion construed the acceptance by the defend-
ant of the property as a separate bailment contract for a special
purpose, unaffected by the defendant's limitation of liability as a
carrier. While it is true that cases have held that valuation agree-
ments apply only to property regularly checked, both as to steam-
ships29 and to railroads,30 there can be little doubt that the property
18. Coos Bay Amusement Co. v. Amer. Ry. Exp. Co., 129 Ore. 216,
277 Pac. 107 (1929); Huddy v. Railway Exp. Agency, 181 S.C.
508, 188 S.E. 247 (1936).
19. Union Pac. R.R. v. Burke, 255 U.S. 317 (1921).
20. Everett v. Norfolk & S. R.R., 138 N.C. 68, 50 S.E. 557 (1905).
21. Union Pac. R.R. v. Burke, 255 U.S. 317 (1921). The reduced
rate is construed as consideration for the release.
22. The City of Norfolk, 13 F. Supp. 511 (D. Md. 1936).
23. Peninsula Transit Corp. v. Jacoby, - Va , 26 S.E. (2d)
97 (1943).
24. Primrose v. Western Union Tel. Co., 154 U.S. 1 (1894).
25. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. R.R. v. Dettlebach, 239 U.S. 588 (1916).
This case was decided under the Hepburn Act, 34 Stat. 584 (1906),
49 U.S.C. §20 (11) (1940), and held that the duty of warehouse-
man was one of the services rendered by a carrier within the
meaning of the Act, and hence the limitation would apply in the
case of goods delivered but not called for by the consignee.
26. 16 Stat. 440, 458-459 (1871), 46 U.S.C. §181 (1940).
27. 41 Stat. 456, 491 (1920), 49 U.S.C. §20 (11) (1940).
28. See Kilthau v. International Mercantile Marine Co., 245 N.Y.
361, 365, 157 N.E. 267, 268 (1927).
29. Holmes v. North German Lloyd S.S. Co., 184 N.Y. 280, 77 N.E.
21 (1906).
30. Hasbrouck v. New York Central & H.R.R.R., 202 N.Y. 363, 95
N.E. 808 (1911).
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in the present case was checked in accordance with facilities offered
and provided by the defendant for that purpose, and accepted and
held in the exclusive possession of the defendant in its capacity as a
carrier.3 ' The majority opinion was a correct statement of the law,
and there seems little ground in support of the minority view.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
FEDERAL IMMUNITY FROM STATE INSPECTION LAWS
The Florida Commercial Fertilizer Law' requires an inspection
fee for all commercial fertilizers used in the state, and unless each
bag sold bears the stamp of approval, it is made subject to seizure
and destruction by the sheriff of the county where found.2 For pur-
poses of carrying out the National Soil Conservation Program,8 the
United States, acting through the Secretary of Agriculture, bought
fertilizer outside Florida and shipped it into the state for distri-
bution without state inspection. The Florida Commissioner of Agri-
culture ordered county agricultural associations to stop distribution.
The United States was given an injunction in the district court4 and
defendants appeal. Held, affirmed. The Florida regulation was
made in the exercise of its police power and as such, it does not
extend to the Federal government; its property and transactions are
immune from state police power. Mayo et al. v. United States, 63
Sup. Ct. 1137 (1943).
There can be no doubt that a state can, in the exercise of its
general police power, pass regulatory acts providing for inspection
fee5 so long as the fees are reasonably proportionate to the expenses
31. The dissenting opinion cites Hasbrouck v. New York Central &
H.R.R.R., 202 N.Y. 363, 95 N.E. 808 (1911), as sustaining
its argument to the effect that there was a bailment for a special
purpose, not subject to the contract limitation. Here a suitcase
was intrusted to a trainman to set off at the next stop. When
the plaintiff later opened the bag she found some of her property
had been stolen. Held, the valuation agreement did not apply.
Possession of defendant was not that of a carrier, because the
suitcase had not been checked as baggage nor intrusted to it for
the journey, but only for the special purpose of aiding a passenger
to get the train. Similarly it has been held that the contract pro-
visions in a steamship ticket did not apply to baggage intended
to be taken by the passenger to her stateroom for use during the
voyage, but applied only to baggage left in exclusive control of
the carrier, for which insurance liability existed at common law.
Holmes v. North German Lloyd S.S. Co., 184 N.Y. 280, 77 N.E.
21 (1906). But cf. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. R.R. v. Dettlebach,
239 U.S. 588 (1916), cited supra note 25.
1. Fla. Stat. (1941) c. 576. See particularly §576.11.
2. Id. §576.15.
3. Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, 49 Stat. 163, 16
U.S.C.A. 590 (1935).
4. United States v. Mayo et al., 47 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Fla. 1942).
5. U.S. Const. Art. I, §10. " . . . no State shall, without the con-
sent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or ex-
ports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
